Ultimately, any presidential focus on North Korea would require detail. In extraordinary circumstances, should Kim Jong-un’s command/control/intelligence processes display (1) unacceptably high risks of mechanical/electrical/computer failure; (2) indecipherable pre-delegations of nuclear launch authority; and/or (3) unpredictable/unreliable “launch-on-warning procedures,” a rational American president could experience a need to “preempt.” Here, the probable costs to the United States and its affected allies could be more-or-less overwhelming.

What might actually be expected after a Trump-ordered preemption against North Korea? When all significant factors are taken into account, Pyongyang, would expectedly target American military forces in the region and/or certain high-value South Korean armaments and personnel. Plainly, this is not the expectation of a US president avowedly “in love” with his North Korean counterpart.

There is more. In all plausible scenarios, each side would have to pay close attention to the anticipated wishes of Russia and China. In this connection, does President Trump reasonably believe that China would plan to support him in any still-upcoming nuclear crisis with North Korea?

At a minimum, Mr. Trump’s ongoing and potentially catastrophic trade war with China would suggest a starkly negative reply.

If Donald Trump’s initial defensive first strike against North Korea were less than massive, a rational adversary in Pyongyang would likely take steps to ensure that its own selected reprisal was limited.